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a b s t r a c t
Background: It has recently beenargued that drug-relatedharms cannot be compared, somaking it impos-
sible to choose rationally between various drug policy options. Attempts to apply international human
rights law to this area are valid, but have found it difficult to overcome the problems in applying codified
human rights to issues of drug policy.
Method: This article applies the rationalist ethical argument of Gewirth (1978) to this issue. It outlines his
argument to the ‘principle of generic consistency’ and the hierarchy of basic, nonsubtractive and additive
rights that it entails. It then applies these ideas to drug policy issues, such as whether there is a right to
use drugs, whether the rights of drug ‘addicts’ can be limited, and how different harms can be compared
in choosing between policies.
Result: There is an additive right to use drugs, but only insofar as this right does not conflict with the
basic and nonsubtractive rights of others. People whose freedom to choose whether to use drugs is
compromised by compulsion have a right to receive treatment. They retain enforceable duties not to
inflict harmsonothers. Policieswhich reduceharms tobasic andnonsubtractive rights shouldbepursued,
even if they lead to harms to additive rights.
soun
menConclusion: There exists a
harms which enables com
ntroduction
The harms associatedwith drug use (and our control strategies) are
incommensurable. . .[D]ecisions aboutwhat policy to adopt invari-
ably come down to political (value) judgements about what risks,
harms and benefits (i.e. outcomes) matter the most.
Weatherburn (2009a: 337)
With this attempt to separate fact from value in drug policy
ebates, Weatherburn indicates a fundamental problem in the
tudy of drug policy. How are we to value the various aims and
ffects of drug policy? Arguments continue to rage over the most
ppropriate aims and methods of regulating the use of psychoac-
ive substances (Babor et al., 2010; Inciardi, 2008; Mena & Hobbs,
010; ONDCP, 2010; Rolles, 2009). Most of the arguments on drug
olicy goals have been framed by approaches that can be termed
onsequentialist. They turn onwhat the effects of a particular set of
olicies are or would be. One side values abstinence (or the reduc-
ion of drug use) above other potential consequences. Another puts
ess priority on abstinence but rather values the reduction of harms
o drug users’ health. Without a common criterion for comparing
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these consequences, we are stuck in a discussion between speakers
of incommensurable languages. Ifwe cannot find a basis that can be
sharedbyboth sides, it is unlikely that the argument betweenadvo-
cates of abstinence andharmreduction canmovebeyond repetitive
call and contradictory response.
Previous discussions of this philosophical debate have valuably
exposed the issues, but have not found a way beyond the impasse.
Husak’s (1992) interesting book deliberately – and rather curiously
– refuses to provide an explanation of the moral rights on which it
rests its argument for the right tousedrugs. VanRee (1999) rests his
argument for a new right to use drugs on the authority of thinkers
suchasMill,HayekandRawls.Headmits that their liberalprinciples
are not universally recognised as valid, but provides no explanation
of why people who do not share them should recognise the right
he proposes. MacCoun and Reuter (2001a, 2001b) – who provide
an informative discussion of consequentialist versus deontological
arguments over drug regulation – state that they have ‘no intention
of imposing our moral views’ (MacCoun & Reuter, 2001a,b: 71).
This characterisationof fundamental choices about the aimsof drug
policy as a question of political tradition or personal preference
reduces the possibility that the argument can be resolved. What
is needed, therefore, is a basis for thinking about drug policy that
helps us to resolve, rather than repeat, this long-running debate.
Human rights can provide this basis. There have been attempts
to move drug policy debates onward by arguing that article 12 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (enshrining the right to





























































agency. These include life, physical integrity, health and mental
equilibrium. Without these preconditions, purposive action is not
possible. So agents must value them over other conditions, and
must value those of other people aswell as their own. The corollary34 A. Stevens / International Journ
rivacy) entails a right to use drugs (Hunt, 2004), or by pointing
o contradictions between the enforcement of UN drug conven-
ions and the UN Charter or other legal instruments (Barrett, Lines,
chleifer, Elliott, & Bewley-Taylor, 2008; Bewley-Taylor, 2005;
ena & Hobbs, 2010). Given the widespread governmental com-
itment to such codified human rights (at least in rhetoric, if not
o often in practice) and the ongoing development of case law in
his area, it is valid for lawyers to continue to extend the application
f these standards in the areaof drugpolicy.However, there are two
roblems with this endeavour. One is that the human rights docu-
ents on which it rests may well include some truths that can be
aken to be universal, but they are also the contingent results of his-
orically specific conjunctures in international relations (Donnelly,
003). They are still subject to selective implementation on the
asis of power politics (Normand & Zaidi, 2008). The second prob-
em is that attempts to apply human rights law in this area risk
escending into narrow legalism, with everything depending on
ow the wordings of various conventions are interpreted. The for-
er Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and
rime recently used existing cases to support his argument that
he criminalisation of drug possession is justified within interna-
ional law (Costa, 2010). The judicial interpretation of these cases
s disputed by Barrett (2010). Referring, for example, to the deci-
ion of the UN Human Rights Committee in the 2007 case of Prince
ersus South Africa (in which the Committee stated that the pro-
ibition of cannabis can be seen as proportionate and necessary to
he achievement of legitimate aims), Barrett argues that the Com-
ittee did not carry out an adequate analysis of the proportionality
f the harms of cannabis prohibition to the beneficial effects that
his prohibition might have. This shows how even decisions that
re taken with a common normative basis (in this case, UN human
ights law), must take into account the relative values of various
otential harms (in this case, the harms of cannabis use against
he harm to the religious freedom of the Rastafarian Mr Prince). A
ound basis for debate needs a rationally justified grounding for the
aluation of harms that lies outside the confines of UN documents
although this basis may be able to support their implementation).
Such a basis can be provided by a rationalist, rights-based
pproach, drawing on the neo-Kantian arguments of Gewirth
1978), Gewirth (1996). This approach, as Donnelly (2003) notes,
as rarely been applied to the justification of universal human
ights. This is despite its advantages in not relying on personal
reference, political tradition, the international balance of power,
r legal argument. Rather, it sets out the reasons why all of us
re necessarily committed to the same underlying principles; a
ommitment to upholding the freedom and well-being that are
ecessary for human beings to act towards purposes. These princi-
les do not provide an immediate resolution to these debates, but
ffer a shared basis which enables – and indeed is demanded by –
ational communication.
This is the first article to apply Gewirthian ethics to drug policy.
t briefly outlines how Gewirth’s ‘principle of generic consistency’
ets up a hierarchy of rights. It then applies this hierarchy to policy
ssues such as the right to use drugs and the rights of drug ‘addicts’.
inally, it applies this approach to a specific drug policy scenario
hat Weatherburn (2009a) presents as an irresolvable dilemma.
he basis of rights and harms: the principle of generic
onsistencyIn his book, Reason and Morality, Gewirth (1978) has provided a
ound, universal basis for defining human needs, and therefore for
efining rights and harms. His argument is a contemporary devel-
pment of Kant’s categorical imperative: ‘Act in such a way that
ou treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the personrug Policy 22 (2011) 233–238
of any other, always at the same time as an end and never merely
as a means to an end.’ (Kant, 1981[1785]: 36).
Gewirth writes in technical language. I will attempt to lay out
his argument here in relatively simple terms. It relies on the dialec-
tical method. This involves building steps in the argument from
the initial premise, and showing how it is impossible to deny the
initial premise and the subsequent steps without engaging in self-
contradiction. The initial premise of Gewirth’s argument is that
any person who is a prospective, purposive agent needs both free-
dom and well-being. This is because it would be impossible to act
towards purposes without these necessary conditions of agency.
The first step that Gewirth builds on this premise is that any per-
son who seeks to act must value such freedom and well-being. As
he puts it, ‘[s]ince agents act for purposes they regard as worth
pursuing . . . they must, insofar as they are rational, also regard the
necessary conditions of such pursuit as necessary goods’ (Gewirth,
1982: 47). Gewirth then argues that every agent must accept, on
pain of self-contradiction, that she has rights to the necessary con-
ditions of agency. To deny that she has these rights would be to
allow that she can be refused the basis for agency, and therefore
to allow that she can arbitrarily have her freedom and wellbeing
taken away. The next step is to note that because a person accords
these rights to herself on the grounds of being an agent, then she
must also, again on pain of self-contradiction, accord these rights
to other persons who have the capacity to act towards purposes.
Gewirth calls this the ‘principle of generic consistency’, or PGC.
Echoing Kant’s categorical imperative, the PGC ‘requires of every
agent that he accords to his recipients the same rights to freedom
and well-being that he necessarily claims for himself’ (Gewirth,
1982: 53).
The PGC gives us a stable basis for the analysis of rights and
harms to them.1 It is not dependent on individual, political or cul-
tural preferences, but is universally valid for human agents who
rationallymust value the conditions theyneed for purposive action.
In this perspective, harms can be seen as acts and conditions that
infringe on rights to the freedom andwell-being thatwe all need as
agents. Of course, people are capable of denying that we have these
needs, and therefore these rights. But any such denial is logically
self-defeating. It is therefore entirely unpersuasive when entered
into argument.
A hierarchy of rights
Rights are universal, due to our shared capacity for purposive
action. But they are also always in competition. The negative right
not to have one’s actions limited may conflict with the positive
right of others to the conditions necessary for action. The right to
property, for example, conflicts with the right to life in the case
of a rich man who is unwilling to give up some of his goods to
help a poor man avoid death by starvation. Gewirth uses the PGC
to help resolve such conflicts. The basis of the PGC is found in the
necessary conditions of agency—freedom and well-being. There-
fore, rights are more fundamental and of greater priority if they
are more needful for the creation or maintenance of these condi-
tions. On this basis, Gewirth distinguishes three, hierarchical levels
of rights: basic, nonsubtractive and additive.
Basic rights refer to an agent’s right to the preconditions of1 This is not to say that it is uncontroversial. Many criticisms have been made
of each of the steps in Gewirth’s argument to the PGC. These objections have been
































































out drug use as necessarily and uniquely harmful to reason (and
so specifically worthy of prohibition) is to fall for the ‘myth of the
demon drugs’ (Alexander, 2008: 173). Individual rationality is at all
times bounded and ambiguous. Drug use is one activity amongstA. Stevens / International Journ
f basic rights is the concept of basic harms. These are interferences
n basic rights, such as killing, maiming and depriving others of
he necessary conditions of life (e.g. food, water and shelter). These
armsare ‘non-arbitrarilyharmfulbecause, amid thediversevalues
ifferent persons may have, as actual or prospective agents, they
bjectively need the basic goods that are attacked in such ways’
Gewirth, 1982: 233).
Nonsubtractive rights are also based on the agent’s capacity for
ction. But they refer to less serious harms to this capacity than
he basic harms listed above. Harms to nonsubtractive rights are
hose harms which reduce, but do not destroy, the agent’s capacity
or action. Examples include losses by theft, deception, exploitation
nd defamation. Gewirth places important qualifications on non-
ubtractive rights. They do not apply to losses which could not be
hownobjectively to harman agent’s capacity for action. For exam-
le, if something I do offends you because of your particular beliefs,
nd that offence is based only on your personal preferences, then I
m not imposing nonsubtractive harm upon you. And they do not
pply in situationswhere an institution that is ethically justified by
he PGC reduces an agent’s capacity for purposive action. Gewirth
ives the example of a personwho loses an artistic competition. His
apacity for action may be objectively damaged by this loss, but, as
he rules of the competition are ethically justified, his rights have
ot been harmed. As we shall see, it is more difficult to apply this
ualification to drug regulation than to the Oscars.
Finally, additive rights refer to the ‘means or conditions that
nable any person to increase his capabilities of purpose-fulfilling
ction and hence to achievemore of his goals’ (Gewirth, 1982: 240,
y italics). As an agent rationally must value increasing her own
apabilities to fulfil her purposes, so she must value the increase of
he capabilities of others, and so accord them these additive rights.
he qualification to these rights is that they can be put aside when
hey conflict with the agent’s own basic, or nonsubtractive rights,
r with the ethically justified rules of institutions to which she and
hese others belong. The PGC entails a duty not to act in such a
ay that encourages the spread of physically or mentally harmful
ractices. When the harms of such practices go beyond the imme-
iate participants, then ‘legal regulation and even prohibition may
e justified’ (Gewirth, 1982: 324).
So the PGC sets up a hierarchy of rights, with corresponding
arms, and duties to avoid inflicting harms to oneself as well as to
thers. Harms to basic rights are ‘morewrong’ (Gewirth, 1982: 236)
han harms to nonsubtractive rights, which are in turn more seri-
us than harms to additive rights. The justification of institutions
nd regulationsmust also follow this hierarchy. Itmaybe justifiable
o impose prohibitions to prevent harms to additive goods (which
ncrease people’s capacity for rational purpose fulfilment), but not
f these regulations harm rights to nonsubtractive goods (which
bjectively support rational purpose fulfilment), or – even more
mportantly – basic goods (which objectively support the very pos-
ibility of action). The use of the death penalty for drug lawoffences
s, for example, immediately ruled out. It may – arguably – support
emperance (an additive good), but it ends life (a basic right). Less
xtreme forms of regulation are more complicated, but the PGC
ives us a shared, rational basis for their discussion.
This argument has a deontological basis, in that it is concerned
ith logically justified values and duties. But Gewirth criticises
ormal deontological approaches which value rules but cannot
pecify the content of these rules in relation to their consequences
such as Kant’s [1799] idea that a lie should not be told even if
t would prevent a murder, because lying itself is wrong). Deon-
ological arguments are usually contrasted with consequentialist
pproaches, such as utilitarianism. Gewirth specifically rejects util-
tarian calculation as a basis for judging between potential actions
nd policies. Utilitarianism discusses the content of rules by argu-
ng that doing good should be preferred to doing evil, and thenrug Policy 22 (2011) 233–238 235
multiplying the numbers of people to whom good or evil is done
by the amounts of each that are done. It provides the basis for
many important discussions of drug policy (e.g. Babor et al., 2010;
Boyum & Reuter, 2005). But it has no underlying basis for defining
what is good, and what is evil. The PGC provides a formal, logi-
cally necessary set of rules. But it also enables the consequences
of following these rules to enter the discussion of how to resolve
conflicts between them. It ‘combines the axiological substantive
content of moral duties with a formal consideration of consistency
ormutuality’ (Gewirth, 1982: 203). In thisway, it bridges the divide
between deontological and consequentialist justifications for drug
policy that has been identified by MacCoun and Reuter (2001a,
2001b).
A right to use drugs?
From this discussion, the question will inevitably arise: is there
a right to drug use? The answer is fairly easy in the case of drugs
that are used to save life, or reduce pain. These support basic goods.
It is necessary to be alive and to be free from severe pains in order
to be able to pursue your purposes. But is there a right to use drugs
non-medically?2
It would be possible to construct an argument that there is no
such right. It could consist of two claims. The first is that drug use is
inherently harmful to the ability to guide one’s conduct rationally.
The second is that, as there exists a right to be protected from harm
to our rational capabilities, it is also right that institutions exist that
protect us fromdrug use by forbidding it. There is therefore no right
to drug use.
Of course, there are several problems with this argument. The
first is that drug use is not always harmful to the capacity for ratio-
nal action (Kalant, 2010; Levy, 2006). Indeed, drug intoxicationmay
be one of those intended purposes for people who find it pleasur-
able. Even if a minority of users become dependent on drugs, and
others may suffer other forms of cognitive impairment, it seems
that the vast majority of people who have ever used illicit drugs
(a large proportion of the populations of most developed nations;
UNODC, 2009) have done so without causing lasting damage to
their capacity to act towards intended purposes, and this includes
some very senior politicians (Anthony, Warner, & Kessler, 1994;
Obama, 2004). The idea that drug use is necessarily irrational and
pathological is a 20th century accretion to the traditional notion
of addiction (Alexander, 2008) and to the related development of
drug prohibition. Before themodern era, itwas not thought that the
use of pleasure-giving substances necessarily compromised auton-
omy or free will. More recent developments in brain science have
shown that certain substances have specific effects on the brain
which may affect the choices their users make (Kalivas & Volkow,
2005; London, 2009), but then so do other common experiences
such as eating, sex, bereavement, isolation and falling in love (Aron
et al., 2005; Graybiel, 2008; Lieberman, 2007). Even people who fit
the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for dependence may have chosen
to follow a way of life which offers them the rewards of activity,
company and a recognised identity (Davies, 1997). None of us are
always the best judges of our own interests. All of us have acted
in ways which we might not have chosen in retrospect. To single2 Current controversies over the medical use of cannabis show how hard it is to
draw the boundary betweenmedical and non-medical use of drugs. For this discus-
sion, the currently illicit drugs will be treated as if they had nomedical value, as this
provides the strongest test of whether there is a right to use them.
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any that may cloud our judgement. This does not mean that it is
nevitably either symptomatic or causative of irrationality.
As this claims fails, so the second claim (that institutions based
n these claims are justified in forbidding drug use) also fails. So
he answer to the question of whether there is a right to drug use
ppears to be yes. But it is a rather small yes. People may rationally
hoose to experience the effects of psychoactive substances, even
f they have no objective need for them. The ability to do so falls
ithin the category of additive goods. It increases their capacity
o fulfil their own purposes. Purposes cannot be chosen for other
eople without conflicting with their rights under the PGC.
However, in some circumstances, drug use may cause harms
o the rights of others. Again, the hierarchy of rights applies. Drug
se, as an additive right, cannot be rationally justifiedwhere it leads
irectly to harm to more basic rights. This is why the yes given to
uestion above is so small. If my right to use drugs conflicts with
our rights to retain your property, or to your own health, then that
ight to drug use is superseded.
Some proponents of abstinence might argue that, in practice,
his rules out the right to drug use. They could argue that drug use
nevitably leads to theft (or to higher taxation to pay for treatment
nd imprisonmentofdrugusers) orotherharms toothers. But these
re matters that can be tested empirically, rather than being left at
he level of assumption. And empirically it can be shown that, in
ery many cases, use of psychoactive substances does not lead to
rime, treatment or harms to others. Evendrugs that are considered
ore dangerous, such as cocaine and heroin, havemany users who
o not cause or suffer these types of harm (Cohen & Sas, 1994;
hewan & Dalgarno, 2006; Warburton, Turnbull, & Hough, 2005;
inberg, 1984). For these users, drug use expresses their additive
ights and does not harm any basic or nonsubtractive rights.
If there is a (limited) right to use drugs, then it follows that abso-
ute prohibition of the production and trade in these substances
annot be justified. Institutional limitations on freedom are only
ustified to the extent that they support the hierarchy of rights that
ewirth establishes. Some restrictions on the trade in drugs should
robably remain in place. Commercial promotion and advertis-
ng of drugs would predictably lead to increased use and related
arms, as it has for alcohol (Babor, 2010;MacCoun&Reuter, 2001a,
001b). As this involves a conflict between the additive rights of
hareholders to make additional profits and the basic rights to
ealth of their potential customers, the prohibition of such pro-
otion would be ethically justified. The appropriate method for
nabling availability whilst limiting the associated harms will vary
etween different substances. It may include some of the mech-
nisms, including medical prescription, pharmacy sales and sale
hrough licenced outlets, that are already used for licit psychoac-
ive substances (Rolles, 2009). Careful research will be needed to
nd the right balance of regulation in order to enable the expres-
ion of the additive right to use drugs whilst avoiding harms to
onsubtractive and basic rights.
o ‘addicts’ lose rights?
This discussion of rights to drug use has assumed that we are
ealingwithusebypeoplewhohave full agency, andwho therefore
hare the same rights as other agentsunder thePGC. Butwhat about
eoplewhose agencymay be compromised by the consequences of
heir drug use? Do they lose some of their rights as their agency is
imited? Does this open the door, for example, to forms of coercive
estriction and treatment, in order to protect and re-establish the
gency that has been damaged by drug use?
To answer these questions we need to consider what agency
s and in what ways drug use may damage it. For Gewirth (1978),
gency depends on two conditions: freedom and well-being. Herug Policy 22 (2011) 233–238
defines action that is free as ‘under the agent’s control in that he
unforcedly chooses to act as he does’ (Gewirth, 1978: 27). Drug
use is often seen as involving some form of compulsion, indicating
an inability to choose one’s actions freely. For some, this compul-
sion can be shown in diagrams of brain activity, which show the
body’s natural reward system being significantly altered by pro-
longed drug use, therefore creating a physical inability to choose
not to use drugs. These pictures show us the brain disease of
addiction (London, 2009). Other have pointed out that addiction
still lacks ‘a truly uniform set of symptoms and a distinct site,
source and course of pathology that are necessary and sufficient for
the presence of disease in addiction’ (Reinarman, 2005: 312). The
reduction of addiction to neurobiology is over-simplistic (Kalant,
2010). It rests on a false dichotomy between the enslaved, dis-
eased addict and the purely autonomous, abstinent self (Albert,
2010).
If we see drug dependence, not as a disease in itself, but as a
symptom of various kinds of dysfunction in the complex moti-
vational system (West, 2001), then we can set it alongside other
kinds of intellectual impairment when considering how to treat
those people who display this symptom. The impairments that are
related to drug use and dependence include (depending on the
drug and the user) delayed reactions, poor judgement, low speed
and/or accuracy of information processing,weak visual spatial abil-
ity, poor physical coordination, anxiety and damaged short and
long-term memory (Ksir, Hart, & Ray, 2006). These are similar to
symptoms that are commonly experienced by peoplewho are born
with intellectual impairments, orwho acquire them through illness
or accident. People with reduced intellectual capacities do not lose
their rights to the conditions of agency (Connolly & Ward, 2008).
There is a strong case for seeing people who display the symp-
tomsofdependenceas experiencinga formofdisability, rather than
as essentially criminal or diseased (Sullivan, 2007). Various forms
of risk-taking can lead to specific types of disability. Is a personwho
damages their brain in amotor racing accident anymoreof an agent
than someone who has become dependent on drugs? We should
not base our response to people who suffer from such disabilities
on partial, non-rights based judgements of the behaviours that led
to these disabilities. Rather, we should consider the implications
of the disability for the person as an agent, and the responsibilities
and duties that these entail.
Free autonomy (defined as the capacity to govern one’s own
actions) is only one of the twoelements of agency that is considered
as necessary by Gewirth. The other is well-being.Without the right
to life, physical integrity and human dignity, freedom alone cannot
afford a person the ability to act towards purposes with some hope
of success (which is the basic right that all agents must rationally
accord to each other). So all interventions in the lives of persons
who display the symptoms of dependence must pay attention to
their need for well-being, as well as to the degree of autonomy of
which theyare capable. Responseswhich fail to respect theperson’s
physical integrity (such as compulsory prescription of substances
such as naltrexone) or the need for freedomandwell-being in other
areas of their life (such as compulsory incarceration for the purpose
of treatment) therefore conflictwith the PGC and are not justifiable.
Rather, the response to people who are unable to control their
drug use should be to support them to increase their agency. As
other authors have written, in the context of other types of intel-
lectual disability:
[rights] stipulate that individuals with a disability are entitled
to certain services and consideration from others so that they
can act in accordance with their own life goals. In view of the
fact that they may lack some of the necessary requirements for
effective agency, they are entitled to receive assistance from
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in pursuit of their goals. This is not a matter of charity; it is a
question of having a basic human right to aminimally satisfying
level of existence (Connolly & Ward, 2008: 106).
Persons who lack the basic goods required for agency (includ-
ng drug users who lack freedom to the extent that they are unable
o control their own choices over drug use) may need support of
arious levels of intensity and duration. But this support should
lways have the goal of increasing their level of agency. Interven-
ions towards other goals (e.g. reducing the total costs of harm
stimated to be caused by drug users) risk treating the person as
eans to the ends of other people, and so abusing their rights.
Institutions that base their action on rights (which are the only
ationally justifiable institutions) must respect the rights both of
rug users and of the recipients of drug users’ actions. Carter and
all (in press) argue that this implies that people who are depen-
ent on drugs have a right to effective treatment, to access harm
eduction measures and to receive effective medical treatment
or other conditions. It also implies that dependent drug users
hould receive no automatic exemption from punishment for any
ther crimes that they commit, as they retain responsibility for
heir actions. If they do commit such crimes, then offering them
treatment alternative to an otherwise justified criminal sanc-
ion may offer a way to limit the infliction of penal pain whilst
lso more effectively protecting potential victims from future
ffences (Schaub et al., 2010; Stevens, McSweeney, van Ooyen, &
chtenhagen, 2005).
omparing harms for harm minimisation
The PGC leads to a rational acceptance that drug policy should
im to limit objectively verified harms to rights. Recently, a debate
as broken out over whether minimisation of harm can be seen
s the principle aim of drug policy. As we have seen, Weather-
urn argues that harm is too vague and unmeasurable a concept
o provide the central aim of drug policy. He argues that all drug
olicy approaches have some harms, and implies that it is impos-
ible to choose between them. He argues that ‘[t]his is not a job
or researchers: it is a job for politicians and the public at large’
Weatherburn, 2009a: 337). Othersmight reply that politicians and
he publics they lead do not have a great track record in choosing
ealistic or even worthwhile aims for drug policy. The scope for
olitical manoeuvres and ideology to affect these choices is huge
Stevens, 2011). Researchers are unlikely to make progress on this
ssue by retreating from debate about what drug policy is for.
In her response to Weatherburn (2009a), van Beek accepts that
rug related harmsmay not be directly comparable, butwrites that
e still need an ‘overarching principle’ to inform us what the goals
f drug policy should be (Van Beek, 2009: 342). As Weatherburn
2009b) points out, she does not tell us what this principle is. My
rgument in this article is that Gewirth’s PGC provides it. By defin-
ng theharms thatweare trying to reduce asharms to thenecessary
oods of agency, and in providing a sound rational basis for this def-
nition, the PGC makes harms commensurable. It provides value
udgements that are capable of being tested and are open to public
iscussion. If we need to choose between policies that have dif-
erent effects in producing and reducing harms, we can refer to
hether these harms affect basic, nonsubtractive or additive goods.
olicies which harm goods which are more needful for agency are
o be rejected in favour of policies that harm goods that are less
eedful.
Weatherburn presents a specific policy choice as an example of
he impossibility of choosing between harms:
One policy cuts public drug dealing by 20% but encourages
needle sharing and results in many innocent teenagers beingrug Policy 22 (2011) 233–238 237
stopped, searchedandquestionedby thepolice. Theotherpolicy
reduces needle sharing and minimizes the number of innocent
teenagers stopped searched and questioned by the police, but,
as a consequence, produces a higher level of drug trafficking and
drug-related loitering in and around areas that havemethadone
clinics. Which policy should we adopt? (Weatherburn, 2009a:
337)
Leaving aside thepoint that there arepolicies available that have
been shown to reduce needle sharing without leading to higher
rates of drug dealing and loitering (Independent Working Group,
2006; Kerr, Macpherson, & Wood, 2008; Rhodes & Hedrich, 2010),
here is a policy dilemma that cannot be resolved by reference to
international conventions. Gewirth’s hierarchy of rights, in con-
trast, offers us a way to solve it.
Thefirsthypothetical policy increasesneedle sharingandsopre-
dictablywill lead tohigher ratesof infectiousdisease, serious illness
and death. These are harms to the basic goods of life and physical
integrity. It also leads to harm to the nonsubtractive rights of local
teenagers to go about their daily lives without police interference.
Public drug dealing is not itself a harm to rights, but may lead to
other harms, such as fears amongst local residents that mean they
are less able to make use of public spaces in their area. This is a
harm to the nonsubtractive rights that these people have to use
public spaces to fulfil their own purposes. So one type of nonsub-
tractive harm to one group of people is hypothetically prevented by
harming the basic and nonsubtractive rights of other people. With
no further empirical evidence of harms, the PGC would lead to a
clear choice not to pursue this policy.
Turning to the second of Weatherburn’s policies (which is basi-
cally the obverse of the first), we can see that it reduces harms
to the basic rights of drug users and to the nonsubtractive rights
of local teenagers, whilst affecting some nonsubtractive rights of
local residents. Again, in the absence of other empirical information
on the consequences of these policies, the choice is clear. The PGC
supports policies which favour the protection of basic rights over
thosewhichprotectnonsubtractive rights. Therefore thishypothet-
ical second policy that reduces needle sharing (and therefore the
risk of death) must be preferred to one that protects the rights of
citizens not to be confronted by the sight of drug users.
Conclusion
Of course, arguments over drug policy are not always carried
out on rational grounds. Themoral value of ‘purity/sanctity’, which
is much more common amongst conservatives than liberals (Haidt
& Graham, 2007), has long been influential in determining drug
policy. Ambiguous people and substances are often categorised as
dirty (Douglas, 1966), and so to be avoided and excluded. Douglas
has shown how these types of value shape the moral choices of
both pre-modern and modern societies.
However, just because such quasi-religious judgements have
been important in shaping drug and other policies, this does not
mean that we should accept their continuing influence. Arguments
over drug policy, as any argument does, presuppose that the dis-
cussion is based on reason. Gewirth has shown how the offence
caused by one person’s practices to another person’s moral sensi-
bilities cannot rationally be used in justifying the infringement of
people’s rights to the necessary goods for action.
In this article, I have argued that Gewirth’s approach provides
a sound, rationally justified basis for the debate over drug policy.
It is an approach that bridges deontological and consequentialist
approaches. It doesnot rule policies outwithout paying attention to
their consequences. But it does provide – as utilitarian approaches
cannot – a rational basis for choosing between consequences. This
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pproach will not replace attempts to extend the application of
umanrights lawtoprotect the rightsofdrugusers. It can, however,
upplement them by showing that these rights are not just contin-
ent upon interpretations of UN documents, but are also rationally
ecessary.
This article has only begun to apply this approach to drug policy.
here ismuch debate to be had as to how the consequences of drug
olicies relate to the rights protected by the PGC. It may be the case
hat ideology will continue to dominate drug policy. But I hope to
ave shown that there is a logical, extra-legal basis for these dis-
ussions. Drug policy debates need not be seen as a merely matter
f personal preference, political tradition, technocratic calculation
r legal interpretation. They are an arena for rational and ethical
rgument.
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